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is incorrect; Wellman does demonstrate that if agents have a
moral duty to support the specifically political institutions that
comprise their state, then their support ought to take the form
of obedience to its law.

I.

Simmons’ Critique of Natural Duty Approaches
to the Duty to Obey the Law
David Lefkowitz

University of North Carolina–Greensboro
In his most recent book on the moral duty to obey the law,
A. John Simmons considers and rejects a number of natural
duty approaches to justifying political authority.1 Among the
targets of Simmons’ criticism is the account defended by the
book’s co-author, Christopher Heath Wellman.2 In this essay,
I evaluate the force of Simmons’ objections to Wellman’s
account of political obligation. As will become clear below, I
think Wellman’s defense of the duty to obey the law defective
in certain ways—but not in all of the ways that Simmons argues
it is. By rebutting some of Simmons’ criticisms and identifying
the limits of others, I aim not only to indicate one direction in
which a renewed defense of natural duty approaches to political
obligation might proceed, but also to encourage the pursuit of
such a philosophical project.3
Simmons levels three main challenges to Wellman’s
samaritan account of the duty to obey the law. First, he
questions the existence of a samaritan duty as Wellman
characterizes it, arguing that it is a strange hybrid of a samaritan
duty as understood in paradigm cases of easy rescue and
an imperfect duty of charity. Second, Simmons argues that
Wellman cannot account for the particularity of the duty to
obey the law; that is, the fact that an agent’s alleged moral
duty to obey the law is almost always conceived to be owed
to a particular state, usually the one in which the agent enjoys
legal citizenship. Third, Simmons contends that Wellman’s
argument fails to demonstrate that agents have a duty to obey
the law of their state; rather, at best it entails that most agents
will often, but not always, have good reason to comply with
the law.4 In response, I argue for the following conclusions.
Simmons’ first criticism is correct, but the (alleged) moral
duty Wellman employs as the foundation for his argument
can easily be replaced by some other (genuine) natural moral
duty or duties. Simmons’ second criticism is also correct, but
it only establishes one conclusion that he has long advocated,
namely, philosophical anarchism, and not another, namely,
that consent is the only possible means whereby a state can
come to enjoy authority over an individual, and that individual
a correlative duty to obey the law. Simmons’ third criticism

I begin with a much abbreviated reconstruction of Wellman’s
argument for the duty to obey the law.5
1. All moral agents have a natural duty to rescue others
from significant harms as long as the cost of doing so
is reasonable. Call this a samaritan duty, or duty of easy
rescue.
2. The perils of a Hobbesian state of nature constitute a
significant harm.
3. Therefore, as long as the cost is reasonable, all moral
agents have a samaritan duty to save others from the
perils of a Hobbesian state of nature (or, as Simmons
sometimes writes, a duty to provide security for all).
(From 1 and 2.)
4. Only specifically political institutions—or, more
controversially, the modern state—provide(s) a
reliable defense against the perils of a Hobbesian state
of nature.
5. Therefore, as long as the cost is reasonable, agents
have a samaritan duty to support the state, since only
by doing so can they rescue others from the perils of
a Hobbesian state of nature. (From 3 and 4.)
6. If the benefits that the state provides each individual
are taken into account, the cost to each of them of
supporting the state is a reasonable one.6
7. Therefore, agents have a samaritan duty to support
the state. (From premises 5 and 6.)7
As Wellman recognizes, however, protection from the perils
of a Hobbesian state of nature can be accomplished with less
than universal support for the state. What the argument thus far
implies is that some agents have a samaritan duty to support
the state (specifically, whatever number of agents suffices in a
particular case to ensure that the state succeeds in providing
protection from the perils of a Hobbesian state of nature). What
it does not show is that each agent has a duty to support the state
in every case. In order to establish this conclusion, Wellman
adds another premise:
8. All those with a duty to rescue others from the perils of
a Hobbesian state of nature ought to contribute their
fair share to the achievement of this goal.
Thus, even if my failure to support the state has no effect
on the provision of security for all, I still act wrongly because I
treat unfairly those who do support the state. It is only because
they do so that my failure to support the state does not wrong
those who have a claim against me that they not suffer the
harms likely to occur in the state of nature. Since there is no
morally relevant distinction between those who support the
state and me—we all bear the same samaritan duty—I have no
justification for according myself a privilege I can enjoy only as
long as they do not. Therefore,
9. Agents have a samaritan duty to do their fair share in
supporting the state. (From 5, 6, and 8.)
It still remains to be shown, however, that every agent’s
contribution of his or her fair share of support for the state
must take the form of obedience to law. After all, just as the
state can provide security for all even in the face of a limited
number of non-contributors, so too it can accomplish this goal
even when a limited number of those who support it do so by
means other than obedience to law, or who choose instead to
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support some other state. To address this point, Wellman once
again appeals to fairness:
10. Discretion with respect to the form an agent’s support
for her state will take, or which state she will support, is
something all agents have reason to value.8 Given this,
and given that only a limited exercise of such discretion
is compatible with the state’s provision of security for
all, it follows that any agent who unilaterally exercises
some of this limited discretion treats unfairly the other
members of her state—i.e., those who by forgoing the
exercise of this discretion (which they have reason to
value) make it possible for this defector to act as she
does without undermining the provision of security for
all.
Wellman concludes, therefore, that:
11. All moral agents have a duty to obey the law of their
state. (From 9 and 10.)

II.
Simmons’ first objection to Wellman’s argument concerns the
claim that the duty to save others from the perils of a Hobbesian
state of nature is but one instance of the more general samaritan
duty to rescue others from significant harms when the cost
of doing so is not unreasonable. Paradigmatic cases of easy
rescue involve statistically abnormal threats of immediate or
imminent harm, and given their statistical abnormality (both
in terms of how many people suffer the (risk of) harm and
how often anyone does so) such cases usually involve a rather
limited number of agents. In contrast, the perils of a Hobbesian
state of nature that Wellman invokes to justify a duty to obey
the law are statistically normal, the harm at issue is a future,
potential, one, and the number of people with either a right to
be rescued or a duty to rescue, or both, is (almost) limitless.
There seems to be good reason to doubt, therefore, that the
duty to provide security is an instance of the general samaritan
duty of easy rescue.
Indeed, Simmons argues convincingly that Wellman’s
account of the duty to obey the law rests on an odd hybrid duty
that combines elements of both a samaritan duty of easy rescue
and a duty of charity. The localized nature of the duty to provide
security (i.e., the claim that agents have a duty to rescue their
compatriots), and the fact that those in need of rescue from the
perils of a Hobbesian state of nature have a right to it, follow if
the duty is a genuine samaritan one.9 The fact that the duty to
provide security is owed to all members of an agent’s political
community (and not just those he interacts with face-to-face),
and that it involves the prevention of a potential, future, harm,
which is a perennial rather than periodic threat, follow if the
duty is one of charity. Simmons concludes that “the specific
form of Wellman’s duty seems to be inspired primarily by his
argumentative needs, not by independent reasons to believe
such a duty exists.”10 Moreover, he maintains that as they are
commonly conceived, neither the duty of easy rescue nor the
duty of charity can provide a foundation upon which Wellman
can construct a defense of the duty to obey the law. The
elements Wellman takes from the other duty in constructing
his hybrid indicate those features that each of these duties lack,
but that are necessary for the success of his argument.
Though I think this first objection Simmons raises to
Wellman’s account correct, it is easy enough to see how
Wellman’s argument might be modified to avoid it. Rather
than basing the argument on an alleged duty of easy rescue,
Wellman could instead appeal to a certain conception of those
duties correlative to all agents’ basic moral (or human) rights.
The conception I have in mind is one that understands the
fulfillment of these duties to include positive acts of provision

as well as negative acts of forbearance.11 On such a conception
of people’s basic moral rights, the duty to provide others with
security (or the secure enjoyment of their basic moral rights)
requires that an agent do more than simply refrain from acts
that directly undermine others’ security, such as assaulting
them. In addition, agents must take positive steps to see to it
that all enjoy security, say by contributing to the creation and
preservation of institutions that enforce people’s basic moral
rights, such as a moderately just police force.12 Note that the
duties of positive provision that correlate to people’s basic moral
rights differ from the duty of charity Simmons describes. The
objects of the former are things or forms of treatment owed
to particular people (i.e., each of the agents with a right to it),
while the object of the latter (whatever it may be in a particular
case) is not.13 Furthermore, insofar as it is an imperfect duty,
charity is not something an agent must display in every situation
where it is possible for him to do so; rather, morality permits
an agent to act on a non-moral reason (such as self-interest)
in some percentage of these situations. In contrast, the duties
of positive provision correlative to people’s basic moral rights
are perfect ones, meaning that unless such duties are defeated
by other moral considerations, agents must carry them out in
every situation where it is possible for them to do so.
The replacement of Wellman’s hybrid duty with the duties
correlative to people’s basic moral rights—henceforth, for
brevity’s sake, the duty to promote basic rights—appears to only
exacerbate the challenge to all natural duty approaches that
samaritanism was supposed to address, namely, accounting
for the particularity of the duty to obey the law. Of course, if
Simmons argues correctly when he contends that there is no
reason to accept the existence of the hybrid duty Wellman
describes, as I believe he does, then nothing has been lost
if we substitute for it the duty to promote basic rights, even
if an argument premised on the latter duty cannot justify a
particularized duty to obey the law. Simmons will likely reject
the rough sketch of the duty to promote basic rights I offer here,
especially the idea that all moral agents owe natural duties of
positive provision to all moral persons, and not just those with
whom they have transacted in certain ways (e.g., to whom
they have made a promise), or that they can easily rescue, or
to whom they owe reparation. Unlike Wellman’s hybrid duty,
however, something similar to the duty to promote basic rights as
I characterize it is defended by a significant number of theorists
and practitioners (e.g., non-governmental organizations such
as Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International). Moreover,
many of those who defend it do so without any thought of the
role it might play in a defense of the moral duty to obey the law;
indeed, for all I know, some defenders of the duty to promote
basic rights may be philosophical anarchists. Obviously, these
facts do not demonstrate the truth of a duty to promote basic
rights as I have characterized it here. But they do render such
a duty secure against the kind of objection Simmons makes to
Wellman’s hybrid duty, namely, that there is no reason to believe
that such a duty exists other than the role it plays in a defense
of political obligation.
Moreover, as Simmons makes clear, even if we grant
Wellman his hybrid duty, he still cannot justify an agent’s duty
to support his particular state (and so a duty to provide that
support in the form of obedience to his state’s law). The duty
in question is owed to all those vulnerable to the perils of a
Hobbesian state of nature, not just those who are vulnerable
and who happen to be legal subjects (or citizens) of the same
state as the agent. Even if we assume that the fulfillment of the
duty to provide security requires agents to support specifically
political institutions, it seems quite likely that some agents,
some of the time, will be able to contribute equally or better
to the provision of security for all by supporting political
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institutions other than those that comprise their own state.
As Simmons points out, Wellman and others cannot appeal
to considerations of fairness in order to meet this challenge;
that is, they cannot argue that even though support for some
other political institution contributes just as much or more
to the morally mandatory end, it also involves treating my
fellow citizens unfairly, and so I ought not to do it—or, in other
words, that I have a moral duty to support my particular state.
Considerations of fairness arise only amongst those with a duty
to participate in the collective pursuit or realization of some
end. Yet, thus far, neither Wellman nor any other defender of a
natural duty approach has provided a compelling explanation
for why an agent’s fulfillment of his natural duty requires that he
contribute to the particular collective action scheme (broadly
construed) that partly constitutes the state of which that agent
is a legal subject or citizen.
To repeat, an individual accused of treating his compatriots
unfairly when he elects to promote security for all by sending
money to the United Nations instead of paying taxes to his state
can respond as follows. I only treat you unfairly if I have a duty
to do my fair share of providing security for all by supporting our
particular state. But you have not shown that I must adopt this
particular means for carrying out my duty to provide security for
all. It seems extremely unlikely that you can do so on empirical
grounds; for example, by demonstrating that I can only fulfill this
duty by supporting my particular state, or even that support for
my state will always provide a far superior (i.e., more effective
and/or more efficient) means for doing so, even if it is not the
only means to that end.14 It seems equally unlikely that you
can do so on moral grounds by showing that I have a special
obligation to my compatriots, say one grounded in consent or
my occupying the legal role or office of citizen.15 Of course,
you might invoke a (sui generis) moral duty to rescue one’s
fellow citizens from the perils of a Hobbesian state of nature,
but doing so settles the matter of particularity by fiat, rather than
by rational argument.
In short, Simmons’ criticism of Wellman’s defense of the
duty to obey the law on the grounds that it cannot account
for that duty’s particularity strikes home even if we grant the
existence of the hybrid duty on which Wellman bases his
argument. Nor will Wellman’s argument fare any better if we
replace that hybrid duty with a duty to promote basic rights.
I consider elsewhere the ability of a natural duty approach
that assigns a central place to democracy to account for the
particularity of the duty to obey the law.16 Here, however, I want
to consider the implications for Wellman’s argument of his
inability to demonstrate that an agent’s fulfillment of his natural
duty (whatever exactly it is) must take the form of support for
his particular state.
This shortcoming in Wellman’s account of political
obligation does not eliminate it as a genuine justification for
the moral duty to obey the law. Rather, it entails that agents
can come to have such a duty on something like the grounds
Wellman appeals to only in a world with a single legal system.
Assume for the moment that in order to fulfill their natural duty
to others, agents must support specifically political institutions,
and that their support must take the form of obedience to law.
If all humanity is subject to a single legal system, then given
these assumptions an agent will be able to fulfill his duty only
by obeying the law of this single, global, state. In such a world,
all agents will have a moral duty to obey the law.17 Insofar as the
world is not currently organized as a single state or legal system,
this response to the particularity challenge commits Wellman to
the conclusion Simmons defends in their recent book, namely,
philosophical anarchism. This is the view that few if any subjects
of existing states have a general moral duty to obey the law of

those states. Yet, while Simmons is sometimes concerned to
defend only philosophical anarchism, at other times he defends
a stronger conclusion, namely, that the only possible means by
which a political institution can come to enjoy a morally justified
claim to authority over any individual is via that person’s consent
to its rule.18 However, the particularity requirement does not
appear to rule out as impossible Wellman’s account of political
obligation, or a version of it that replaces the hybrid duty to
rescue others from the perils of a Hobbesian state of nature
with a duty to promote basic rights. It seems worth considering,
therefore, the validity of Simmons’ third criticism of Wellman’s
argument for the duty to obey the law.19
Simmons contends that even if he grants “that I am morally
bound to do my fair share in preventing the local emergency of
lawlessness,” it does not follow that he has a moral duty to obey
the law. This is so because obedience to law is but one method
of responding to the emergency, which is not lawlessness
itself, but rather the harm (or perhaps vulnerability to harm)
that people suffer in the absence of law (i.e., in a Hobbesian
state of nature). Simmons argues that he could carry out his
duty by directly providing security for himself and two or three
others in need of it, perhaps “fancifully, by building a secure
compound in which I invite some others to stay.”20 In fact,
Simmons is unwilling to grant Wellman even this much; as he
goes on to ask:
Why can I not simply do the duty described by
Wellman just by scrupulously refraining from violence
(deception, etc.) toward others (and letting others see
my intention in this regard), while acknowledging no
duty at all to obey the law? Since legal coercion and a
sense of duty can assure my fellow citizens of my doing
no more than this in any event, how can it be that my
anarchist refusal to obey constitutes a failure to do my
part in contributing to the security of all?21
Both of these objections follow from a purely instrumental
interpretation of Wellman’s argument; that is, Simmons
understands Wellman to be claiming that agents must contribute
their fair share to the provision of local security—that is an end
they are morally required to promote—and argues that Wellman
does not show obedience to law to be a necessary means to that
end. As I will now demonstrate, however, Wellman’s argument
for the duty to obey the law is not a purely instrumental one.22
Consider, first, Simmons’ claim that he can contribute his
fair share to the provision of local security simply by refraining
from acts that directly violate others’ rights, and making clear to
others that he will do so. As I indicated earlier, I believe (and I
think Wellman does as well) that the provision of local security
requires that agents do more than simply refrain from certain
sorts of rights-violating conduct. In addition, it requires support
for institutions that enforce people’s rights, such as a police
force, and institutions that determine when people’s rights
have been violated, such as courts. Standards of justice for the
latter sort of institution, such as a (defeasible) prohibition on ex
post facto conviction, entail the moral necessity of institutions
that provide publicly accessible rules defining what sorts of
conduct will be viewed as rights-violating; in other words, a
legislative body. At the very least, then, an agent will have to
contribute a share of the resources necessary for the creation
and maintenance of such institutions; that is, pay a tax and
perhaps take a turn in one or more of the offices in these
institutions.
At least for the sake of argument, however, Simmons
appears willing to grant that doing one’s fair share in the
provision of local security requires positive action, and not
merely refraining from acts that directly violate others’ rights.
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He denies, however, that this positive action must take the
form of obedience to law; for example, the payment of taxes.
Rather, Simmons maintains that an agent could contribute his
fair share to the provision of local security by directly protecting
a few people from the rights-violating conduct of others. It may
appear that Wellman can rebut this claim simply by appealing to
the following two reasons he gives as part of his justification for
the state. First, even well-intentioned and conscientious agents
will likely reasonably disagree as to what counts as the adequate
provision of security to (local) others, and/or what counts as
doing one’s fair share of that task. Second, such agents are also
likely to suffer from, or be perceived to be suffering from, various
biases when they serve as judges in disputes to which they are
a party. In the absence of specifically political institutions—i.e.,
ones that provide a relatively neutral (and, therefore, to some
extent, just) method for settling disagreements like those just
mentioned (at least for action-guiding purposes), applying
those settlements to particular cases, and enforcing them when
necessary—the practically inevitable result will be frequent
harmful (or rights-violating) conflicts. Thus, it is not possible
to contribute one’s fair share to the provision of local security
by means other than adherence to law (or, more precisely, the
law that governs local relations).23
Yet, Simmons will counter that as long as a sufficient
number of people do their fair share of providing local security
by obeying the law, the considerations Wellman points to
will not suffice to show that he must obey it. Rather, a limited
number of agents, including Simmons, will be able to fulfill their
duty by means other than obedience to law. In some cases, we
may suppose, there will be no disagreement between Simmons
and the law as to what justice requires, either in the abstract or
in a particular case. In other cases, Simmons might think the
law mistaken, but also think that given widespread compliance
with the law and the likely consequences for him and those he
protects should he act contrary to it, what he morally ought to
do, all things considered, is act as the law demands. In these
cases Simmons will have a moral reason to comply with the law,
but not to obey it. Finally, in some cases Simmons may think the
law mistaken, and believe with good reason that disobedience
to it will not result in any harm, either to him and those he
protects, or to others, or to the state’s ability to provide security.
In these cases, Simmons will have neither a moral reason to
obey the law, nor a moral reason to comply with it.
To claim that an agent has a moral duty to obey the law is
to claim that he has a (perhaps prima facie) duty to do what the
law demands simply because the law demands it. In contrast,
to claim that an agent has a moral reason to comply with the
law is to claim that he has a moral reason to act as the law
demands, but not because the law demands that he so act.
As was just indicated, an agent can deny the law’s claim to
authority, and at the same time acknowledge that he is morally
required to act as a particular law would have him act because
he has independent moral reasons to do so (as in the case of
a law prohibiting murder) or because contingent factors such
as patterns of coordination established by the law (and/or
the state’s coercive enforcement of it) entail that, all things
considered, the morally best act for the agent to do is the one
the law demands from him.24 Simmons’ claim, again, is that at
best Wellman’s argument shows that he will sometimes, but
not always, have a moral reason to comply with the law. It does
not show that he has a duty to obey it.
Simmons fails to recognize, however, that considerations
of fairness play two distinct roles in Wellman’s argument. First,
as Simmons notes, fairness figures centrally in the specification
of the end morality requires each agent to promote. Each agent
must contribute his or her fair share to the provision of (local)

security. But second, fairness—or treating others fairly—also
figures essentially in Wellman’s argument that each agent’s
contribution must take the form of obedience to law. Wellman
grants that cases are likely to arise in which either (a) an agent
can do an equal or better job of supporting the state (and so
providing local security) by acting contrary to the law, or (b)
that it will make no difference to the existence and efficacy of
the state (and so to the provision of security for all) whether or
not the agent complies with the law. However, in both cases
an agent’s acting contrary to the law is compatible with the
state’s provision of security for all only because a significant
number of agents comply with it. In other words, the liberty
or discretion to act contrary to the law cannot be enjoyed
simultaneously by all, and therefore, Wellman argues, it would
be unfair for any particular agent to unilaterally exercise the
discretion that is possible for some, but not all, to enjoy when
all have an equal claim to it. Note that the unfairness follows
from the unilateral exercise of discretion to which all have a
claim but that some can enjoy only as long as others do not.
Presumably Wellman will not object if the limited exercise of
discretion compatible with the effective provision of security by
the state is distributed by a fair procedure, such as a fair lottery
or a majority rule decision procedure in which all have an equal
vote. The problem is that the unilateral exercise of this limited
discretion is not such a procedure.
Some might argue that a first-come first-served principle
for distributing the limited discretion at issue also counts as a
fair distribution, since it is “unclaimed” and so open to all.25
This claim strikes me as false. Even if natural resources can
be accurately described as unclaimed until some agent does
something to take possession of them, and thereby acquire
a right to them, the same is not true of the limited discretion
at issue here. This is so because that discretion—that is, the
possibility of acting contrary to law without failing in one’s
samaritan duty to contribute one’s fair share to the provision
of (local) security—obtains only because enough other agents
comply with the law. In other words, those other agents
collectively create the discretion in question, and, therefore,
decisions about how it ought to be distributed must be made
collectively or, as I argue elsewhere, via a procedure that gives
each of the agents that (ought to and do) play a part in creating
it equal authority to settle this matter.26 Note that no agent can
justify acting contrary to law by claiming that he is exercising
only his fair share of discretion, since this requires that he act
on the very sort of unilateral judgments (e.g., regarding the
existence of limited discretion, and what counts as a fair share)
that agents must foreswear acting on in order to treat (local)
others fairly.
The duty to obey the law follows from the moral
requirement that agents treat fairly those with whom they
act in order to provide security for all. As Simmons himself
acknowledges elsewhere, the duty to treat others fairly is a
matter of respect for others’ status as moral agents.27 As such,
it is not justified on instrumental grounds; for example, merely
because it is a means to a state of affairs in which all those
with a right to it enjoy security. Thus, obedience to law is not
owed to others because they are vulnerable to various harms
or wrongs likely to occur in a Hobbesian state of nature; rather,
it is owed to others because they have an equal claim to the
discretion made possible by the fact that the law can tolerate
a limited amount of disobedience. By obeying the law, agents
acknowledge their compatriots’ equal claim, and so their equal
status as moral agents.
Simmons only briefly acknowledges this second role that
fairness plays in Wellman’s defense of the duty to obey the
law, and he clearly does not appreciate its non-instrumental
character. He writes:
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obedience is only a means to general enjoyment
of the good of security…the fact (if it is a fact) that
everyone’s using his discretion in genuinely trying
to treat others well would cause chaos [does not
effect the conclusion that] if one can do one’s part
in promoting that good without obeying the law, one
has surely in so doing discharged any moral duty one
might have.28

any world except one governed entirely by a single state or
legal system.30

As I have shown, Wellman does not offer a purely instrumental
justification for the duty to obey the law. Rather, Wellman offers
an instrumental justification for the state (or political institutions,
or a legal system): it is the only means for achieving a state of
affairs in which all enjoy security. Wellman then offers a noninstrumental justification for the claim that all moral agents
have a duty to support it (even if their support is not necessary
for the achievement of security), and, as we have just seen, the
claim that support for the (or one’s own) state must take the
form of obedience to law. Only by doing so, Wellman claims,
can those with a duty to support the (same particular) state treat
one another fairly. I conclude, therefore, that Simmons does
not succeed in his attempt to show that, even granting him a
duty to do one’s fair share in providing local security, Wellman
cannot justify the claim that agents must obey the law in order
to discharge this duty.
Note that this rebuttal of Simmons’ argument depends
on the assumption, which for the sake of argument Simmons
explicitly grants, that agents have a duty to do their fair share
in the provision of local security. I have assumed that “local
security” is synonymous with “security for one’s compatriots or
fellow legal subjects,” an assumption I take Simmons to share
in this context. As I discussed earlier, Simmons rightly points
out that claims of fairness only gain traction once an agent
has a duty to participate in a given collective action scheme
(broadly construed). It is only because it is assumed that agents
have a duty to provide local security—that is, to support their
particular state—that it is possible to appeal to considerations
of fairness to explain why their support must take the form of
obedience to law.

III.
The preceding discussion highlights two important points
regarding natural duty approaches to justifying a moral duty
to obey the law. First, with respect to Simmons’ (and others’)
many criticisms, recent examples that combine instrumental
and non-instrumental arguments, such as Wellman’s appeal
to both a samaritan duty of easy rescue and considerations of
fairness, or my own appeal to the duty to promote basic moral
rights and the duty to respect others’ equal claim to authority
over the form morally necessary collective action ought to
take, fare better than previous accounts such as Rawls’ and
Waldron’s, which rely on instrumental arguments alone.29 Unlike
those earlier defenses of political obligation, mixed accounts
provide a plausible (and perhaps even compelling) justification
for why all agents must support specifically political institutions
if they are to fulfill certain of their natural duties, and why, if
they have a duty to support the particular state in which they
enjoy legal citizenship, that support must (at least) take the
form of obedience to law. But, second, proving the antecedent
of this last conditional claim continues to pose a challenge for
advocates of natural duty approaches. Unless they can provide
some justification for the claim that agents must support their
particular state, those philosophers that ground their defense
of political obligation in one or another natural duty will be
unable to show that existing agents have a duty to obey the law
of their state; indeed, they may be unable to show that agents
have a duty to obey the law grounded in some natural duty in
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defense of a moral duty to obey the law over the past three
decades. Despite the fact that many of the most important
philosophers in the Western tradition have addressed this
topic, I think it no exaggeration to say that none has made a
greater contribution to the debate over the duty to obey the
law than has John Simmons.
4. As I explain in more detail below, if an agent has a duty to
obey the law, then the mere fact that the law requires some
act from him provides him with a (possibly prima facie)
moral reason to do that act. An agent has a reason to comply
with the law if some fact other than the law’s requiring it
provides the agent with a reason to do that which the law
would have him do. One can comply with a law (i.e., do
that which the law would have one do) without obeying it
(doing what the law would have one do because the law
demands it); in fact, most people most of the time probably
merely comply.
5. I will not attempt to summarize here Wellman’s defense of
each of the premises in the following argument. In particular,
I will assume that Wellman reasons correctly when he
argues that only political institutions (or, more precisely, a
certain sort of modern state) can provide reliable protection
against the perils of a Hobbesian state of nature. Simmons
concedes something like this when he argues against the
political (as opposed to philosophical) anarchist for the moral
justifiability of a certain kind of state. See A. John Simmons,
Justification and Legitimacy: Essays on Rights and Obligations
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 122-57. Note
that both Simmons and Wellman distinguish between a
state’s being justified—i.e., its enjoying a (possibly protected)
liberty-right to enact, apply, and enforce laws—and a state’s
enjoying legitimacy—i.e., its enjoying a morally justified
claim to authority over its subjects, to which correlates those
subjects’ duty to obey the state’s laws.
6. Note that unlike fair-play arguments in defense of the duty to
obey the law, the receipt of benefits from a particular state
is not what grounds an agent’s duty to support it. Rather,
the natural duty to rescue others from the perils of the state
of nature does so, but only on the condition that the duty
can be carried out at a reasonable cost. Wellman’s claim
regarding the benefits individuals receive from the state is
meant to address this condition. Unlike fair-play arguments,
it makes no difference here whether the agent would prefer
to forgo the benefits the state provides, at least at the price
the state demands for them. Rather, as long as the agent
receives enough benefits from the state so that the net
cost for him of compliance with the law is reasonable, he
has a samaritan duty to support the state. George Klosko’s
criticism of Wellman rests in part on the failure to appreciate
the importantly different role that benefits to the individual
play in fair-play and samaritan accounts of the duty to obey
the law; see Klosko, “Samaritanism and Political Obligation:
A Response to Christopher Wellman’s ‘Liberal Theory of
Political Obligation’,” Ethics 113 (2003): 835-40.
7. More precisely, agents have a duty to support a particular kind
of state: at the very least, one in which agents (all agents? the
average agent?) enjoy greater security than they would were
they living in the state of nature. All references to the state
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or to an agent’s particular state will assume that the state in
question meets at least this criterion.
Wellman claims that this follows from “the commonsensical
idea that each of us has good reason to want to be the author
of our own lives, to choose the type of things on which we
expend time and energy, and to be the one who determines
which causes we support” (“Samaritanism,” p. 41).
One might well question the first of these two claims, as I
make clear later in this paper.
Simmons, “Natural Moral Duties,” p. 183.
For one defense of the duty to obey the law grounded in
such a conception of agents’ basic moral rights, see Allen
Buchanan, “Political Legitimacy and Democracy,” Ethics 112
(2002): 689-719.
Or at least this is so insofar as such institutions are practically
necessary for the secure enjoyment by all of their basic moral
rights.
Or at least Simmons thinks this true of the duty of charity;
see “Natural Moral Duties,” p. 183.
For arguments in support of this claim, see Simmons, “Natural
Moral Duties,” and Sam Duncan, “The Borders of Justice: Kant
and Waldron on Political Obligation and Range Limitation,”
Social Theory and Practice 33:1 (2007): 27-46.
Moreover, if you could make such an argument, then there
would be no need to appeal to a natural duty, such as
Wellman’s hybrid duty or the duty to promote basic rights,
in order to justify my duty to obey the law.
Lefkowitz, “Democratic Authority and the Particularity
Requirement,” manuscript on file with author.
The reader may wonder whether the particularity challenge
would still arise if such a world were organized as a single
federal state. To take an analogous case, why must I pay
property taxes to the relatively well-off state of North
Carolina, rather than sending that money to the relatively
poor state of Mississippi? I have argued previously that if
decisions regarding the basic or constitutional structure of
a legal system—including questions of jurisdiction such as
federalism—are settled by a democratic procedure in which
all those with a duty to support the political institutions
in question enjoy a right to equal participation, then this
variation on the particularity challenge can be met. If
successful, this argument also addresses the case of a global
federal state. See Lefkowitz, “A Contractualist Defense of
Democratic Authority,” Ratio Juris 18:3 (2005): 360-61.
Simmons, “Natural Moral Duties,” p. 120; “Consent Theory
for Libertarians,” Social Philosophy and Policy 22:1 (2005):
346-47.
Those concerned only with finding a moral justification
for (some) existing states’ claims to authority, and so their
citizens’ (or subjects’) duty to obey them, may view the
continuation of this discussion as being of purely academic
interest (in the derogatory sense of that phrase). Yet the
outcome may have important implications for current
practice. Suppose that a state of affairs in which the law
actually enjoys the authority it claims is an end (though
not the only end) that agents morally ought to promote. It
makes a significant difference to what an agent ought to do
if consent is the only means whereby a state can come to
enjoy a justified claim to authority over individuals, or if it
might also come to enjoy such authority on the grounds set
out in the modified version of Wellman’s argument for the
duty to obey the law. If the former is true, then agents should
promote a state of affairs in which agents can freely consent
to the rule of a particular state. If the latter is true, they should
do this or they should seek to create a single global state (or,
perhaps better, a well-integrated global legal system).
Simmons, “Natural Moral Duties,” p. 187.
Ibid., p. 188.
It may be that I am misinterpreting this last quote from
Simmons, and that what he intends to challenge is the
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claim that agents must be motivated by the belief that they
have a duty to obey the law. If that is what he means (and I
suspect it is not), then the challenge is easily met, for neither
Wellman nor to my knowledge any other defender of the
duty to obey the law defends such a claim. Their concern is
with a (purported) standard of right action, not judgments
of moral worth or of an agent’s character.
As many philosophers point out, this argument seems
to require the creation of a single global state. Given my
earlier remarks about Wellman’s ability to account for the
particularity of the duty to obey the law, such an implication
may be a good thing. It is important to remember, however,
that states and other sorts of political institutions have often
inflicted, and still do inflict, massive violations of basic moral
rights. It may be, then, that the morally best world, at least with
respect to maximizing the number of people that securely
enjoy their basic rights, will be one that strikes some sort
of balance between interaction in the state and interaction
in the state of nature. If so, then if it were possible to move
from the present world to that one in a morally permissible
manner, and if the transition costs were not too high, then
it would follow that agents morally ought not to pursue the
only state of affairs in which Wellman’s argument entails that
they have a duty to obey the law.
See Simmons, “Natural Moral Duties,” p. 191, for a more
complete description of the reasons an agent can have to
comply with the law (in a particular case).
Interestingly, if the only alternative to an agent’s unilateral
exercise of this limited discretion were that no one exercise
it, the Lockean proviso would not prohibit such an act, since
all of the agents would be left with “enough and as good” a
degree of liberty as they would have enjoyed had the agent
not unilaterally exercised the discretion at issue.
Lefkowitz, “Contractualist Defense”; see also Buchanan,
“Political Legitimacy,” and Thomas Christiano, “The Authority
of Democracy,” Journal of Political Philosophy 12:3 (2004):
266-90.
Simmons, Justification and Legitimacy, pp. 29-31.
Simmons, “Natural Moral Duties,” p. 188.
Lefkowitz, “Contractualist Defense”; “On a Moral Right
to Civil Disobedience,” Ethics 117 (2007): 202-33; John
Rawls, A Theory of Justice (Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press,
1971); Jeremy Waldron, “Special Ties and Natural Duties,”
Philosophy and Public Affairs 22 (1993): 3-30.
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